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Property Settlement or Separation Agreement: Perpetuating the
Confusion-Buffington v. Buffington
Domestic law in North Carolina has changed dramatically since 1867 when
the North Carolina Supreme Court recoiled at the idea of a "separation agree-
ment," which "would virtually annul our marriage laws, and make the relation
of husband and wife a mere trade or bargain, dependent upon their caprice." 1
Over time, the courts and the legislature have come to accept as valid separation
agreements between spouses.? In 1981 North Carolina joined other common-
law states by adopting a system for equitable distribution of property upon di-
vorce.3 Equitable distribution statutes reflect the growing view that marriage is
a partnership, and that if a marriage ends, a fair and comprehensive system
should govern the economic division of property.
4
In Buffington v. Buffington5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals tried to
continue North Carolina's progression from outdated common law to modem
policies governing marriage.6 The court interpreted North Carolina General
Statutes section 50-20(d)7 of the equitable distribution statute to reject the for-
mer public policy rule that a property agreement between spouses was invalid
unless the parties were actually separated.8 In its brief opinion, the Buffington
court opened a Pandora's box of problems for drafters of marital agreements by
committing the common mistake of ignoring the distinction between "property
settlements" and "separation agreements." 9 In addition, the court failed to con-
sider the potential conflict between its holding in Buffington and other recent
1. Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 153, 159 (1867).
2. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
3. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (1984)). Mississippi is the only common-law property state that has not yet adopted
an equitable distribution system. See Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A
Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1423 n.103 (1984). Eight states
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington) have community
property laws. See Family Law I: Property Division upon Divorce, 1983 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 973,
973-74 n.3 (1984).
4. Sharp, supra note 3, at 1455; see also Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North
Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L. REv. 247, 247 (1983) (Equitable distribution systems
reflect the concept of marriage as "a shared enterprise to which both spouses make valuable
contributions.").
5. 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
6. rd. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100. Applying rules of statutory construction, the court held that
the legislature had "manifested a clear intent to change the former [common-law] rule." Id.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1984) provides:
Before, during and after marriage the parties may by written agreement, duly executed and
acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 52-10 and 52-10.1, or by a written
agreement valid in the jurisdiction where executed, provide for distribution of the marital
property in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be
binding on the parties.
8. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100. The court used the term "property
settlement" in its discussion of the former common-law rule. For a criticism of this phrasing, see
infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina decisions. 10
The facts of Buffington were relatively simple. The Buffingtons were mar-
ried on June 13, 1970.11 They subsequently experienced marital problems and
executed a separation agreement on November 12, 1981.12 After signing the
agreement, both spouses continued to reside in the marital home until Novem-
ber 30, 1981.13 Under the terms of the separation agreement, Mrs. Buffington
was to convey her rights in five real estate properties to Mr. Buffington in ex-
change for Mr. Buffington's payment of $60,000.14 On December 10, 1982, Mr.
Buffington filed suit for divorce and specific performance of the separation agree-
ment.15 Mrs. Buffington did not contest the divorce, but counterclaimed for
equitable distribution under section 50-20, alleging that the separation agree-
ment was void.16 After obtaining an absolute divorce, both parties moved for
summary judgment on defendant wife's counterclaims. The trial court found
the agreement valid and denied defendant's motion.'
7
On appeal 18 defendant based her argument on long standing public policy
that voided a separation agreement unless the parties were separated at the time
they executed the agreement or planned to separate immediately after its execu-
tion. 19 Defendant argued that by referring to North Carolina General Statutes
sections 52-10 and 52-10.1, the requirements in section 50-20(d) implicitly af-
firmed existing public policy rules governing separation agreements. 20 Plaintiff
argued that the clear language of section 50-20(d) explicitly approved property
10. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
11. Record at 1.
12. Id. The parties captioned their contract of November 12, 1981, as a "Separation Agree-
ment." Id. at 4.
13. In the original complaint, Mr. Buffington, plaintiff, alleged that he "allowed" defendant to
remain in the house until she made other arrangements. Id. at 1. Defendant described the 18-day
period between November 12 and November 30, 1981, quite differently. She mentioned common
displays of affection and one occasion of sleeping in the same bedroom. Brief for Defendant-Appel-
lant at 14.
14. Record at 4-8. Defendant also waived any rights she might have had for alimony or sup-
port payments from plaintiff. Id. at 13.
15. In the alternative, plaintiff claimed damages for defendant's breach of the agreement. Buff-
ington, 69 N.C. App. at 484, 317 S.E.2d at 98.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Before reaching the merits of the case, the court of appeals first addressed some procedural
issues. Id. at 485-86, 317 S.E.2d at 98-99. The court noted that the denial of summary judgment
was a proper order for appeal because it disposed of an issue that affected defendant's substantial
rights. The court also recognized that defendant had failed to compile her record for appeal in the
proper form. Because of "the importance of the issues presented," however, the court used its dis-
cretionary power to consider the appeal. Id.
19. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8-11. See 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 4, at 10 (rev. ed. 1983). Defendant also raised the question whether
the parties had actually separated before November 30, 1981. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 11-
14. This issue, however, was a question of fact and would not have been properly raised in defend-
ant's summary judgment motion.
20. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14-19; see also Note, The North Carolina Act for Equitable
Distribution of Marital Property, 18 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 735, 738 (1982) (Under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(d), "the key to establishing a valid separation agreement is physical separation.").
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1984) provides, in part, that "contracts between husband and wife not
inconsistent with public policy are valid." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1984) is a general authoriza-
tion for married couples to execute separation agreements not inconsistent with public policy.
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settlements without requiring immediate separation of the spouses.2 1 Plaintiff
also argued that his interpretation of section 50-20(d) was consistent with ex-
isting law on property distribution.2 2 The court of appeals accepted plaintiff's
basic interpretation of section 50-20(d) and held that "the public policy of our
state, as expressed by G.S. § 50-20(d), permits spouses to execute a property
settlement at any time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereaf-
ter or not."'23 Based on this finding, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's
summary judgment motion and barred her from equitable distribution of the
marital property.24
The common-law fiction that a wife's identity merged with her husband's
and made the couple "one person" initially prevented judicial acceptance of any
contract between a husband and wife.25 Although by the late nineteenth cen-
tury courts generally allowed married parties to contract with each other, a large
degree of judicial hostility to separation agreements remained. 26 In the 1912
case of Archbell v. Archbell,27 the North Carolina Supreme Court finally held
that separation agreements between spouses were not void as a matter of law.28
The court held, however, that separation agreements were valid only under cer-
tain conditions. The Archbell case established the rule that separation of the
parties must occur prior to or immediately after the agreement's execution for
the agreement to be valid.2 9 This requirement reflected the widespread disap-
proval of agreements facilitating divorce and agreements contingent upon di-
vorce. 30 This public policy, which voided any agreement made in contemplation
of divorce and without separation, prevailed in most states throughout most of
21. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 6-9. Plaintiff argued that the references in § 50-20(d) to
§§ 50-10 and 50-10.1 only incorporated technical requirements for properly executed agreements.
Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's argument consistently ignored the distinction
between separation agreements and property settlements. Id. at 9; see infra notes 71-75 and accom-
panying text
23. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
24. Id.
25. See 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 188, at 465 (4th ed. 1980); Sharp, Di-
vorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and the State, 59 N.C.L. REV. 819,
827 (1981); see also Comment, An Analysis of the Enforceability of Marital Contracts, 47 N.C.L.
REv. 815, 816-17 (1969) (theory behind unity of married couple was fear that the husband was a
dominating influence on the wife).
26. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 828.
27. 158 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 327 (1912).
28. Id. at 413, 74 S.E. at 329.
29. Id.; see 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 188, at 469-70. In Smith v. Smith, 225 N.C. 189, 194, 34
S.E.2d 148, 151 (1948), the court restated the Archbell requirements for a valid separation agree-
ment:
(1) Existing separation or separation immediately following the execution of the deed,
(2) Some adequate reason for executing a separation agreement other than the par-
ties' "mere volition,"
(3) Circumstances surrounding the execution which were fair and reasonable to the wife,
(4) Statutory formalities.
30. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 830-31; 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 823 (1983);
see also Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968) ("mT1he law now
looks with disfavor upon an agreement which will encourage or bring about a destruction of the
home."). The requirement of immediate separation also meets the need for consideration in a valid
separation agreement. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 19, § 4, at 6.
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the twentieth century.3 1 Following a 1970 Florida case,3 2 courts in many juris-
dictions began to apply the "contemplating divorce" standard more loosely to
antenuptial agreements and to agreements made during the marriage but with-
out immediate separation.3 3 In North Carolina, courts tended to invalidate only
the more outrageous contracts on the basis of contemplating divorce.34 The
policy was not abandoned35 however, and the requirement of immediate separa-
tion for a valid separation agreement remained entrenched in North Carolina
law.36 Thus, although the law eventually favored separation agreements, 3 7 until
Buffington it still forbad separation agreements executed without immediate
separation.38
Throughout the development of law defining and enforcing marital con-
tracts, courts and advocates have repeatedly confused the terms "separation
agreement" and "property settlement."'3 9 The distinctions between a true sepa-
ration agreement and a true property settlement are simple. A separation agree-
ment is a contract between spouses providing for marital support rights and is
executed while the parties are separated or are planning to separate immedi-
ately.4 ' A property settlement provides for a division of real and personal prop-
erty held by the spouses.4 ' The parties may enter a property settlement at any
time, regardless of whether they contemplate separation or divorce.42 The term
"postnuptial agreements" generally is used to describe property division con-
tracts or property transfers executed by spouses who have no intention of sepa-
rating.43 North Carolina follows the practice of most states and treats
"separation agreements" and "property settlements" differently in various
31. See Klarman, Marital Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397,
397-98 (1977); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. Rlv.
1169, 1259 (1974).
32. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384-85 (Fla. 1970).
33. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 183.1, at 446-48; Klarman, supra note 31, at 399-402; Note,
supra note 20, at 737; 24 Am. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 825 (1983).
34. Sharp, supra note 25, at 831-32; see also Howland v. Stitzer, 236 N.C. 230, 72 S.E.2d 583
(1952) (applying New York law, court held that agreement intended to smooth litigation process
would not be per se void for contemplating divorce).
35. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 157, 319 S.E.2d 315, 321 (1984) ("It
is well established that a promise or contract looking to the future separation of a husband and wife
will not be sustained.").
36. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 188, at 470-71; 1 A. LnDEY, supra note 19, § 4, at 10-11;
Sharp, supra note 25, at 831-32; Merritt, Changing Marital Rights and Duties By Contrac" Legal
Obstacles in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FoREsr L. REV. 85, 99 (1977).
37. Sharp, supra note 25, at 830.
38. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
39. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 826-27.
40. See id. at 826.
41. Id.; 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187.
42. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 463-64; Sharp, supra note 25, at 826; 24 AM. JUR. 2D,
Divorce and Separation § 817 (1983); see also Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1977)
(lower courts misled by assuming that support payments and property settlement fell into same
category); Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826 (1961) (noting clear distinction between
consideration of property settlement and alimony provisions).
43. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 186; 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 19, §§ 3-4. Antenuptial
agreements-agreements in which prospective spouses fix their respective rights in each other's
property prior to their marriage-fall under the same policy guidelines as postnuptial agreements.
See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, §§ 179, 186; Note, supra note 20, at 737.
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circumstances."4
Although the substance and analysis of a separation agreement and a prop-
erty settlement should be distinct, the provisions often are confused when con-
tained in a single document.4 5 Usually the parties will refer to the entire
document as a "separation agreement," even though its provisions cover both
support rights and property rights. 46 Gradually, North Carolina courts have
developed rules distinguishing between the support provisions and the property
settlement provisions found in most separation agreements. These distinctions
have been particularly important with regard to issues of modification 47 and
reconciliation. 48 The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently addressed
both issues.49
Prior to 1983 North Carolina courts had a settled approach to dealing with
the modifiability of provisions in a separation agreement.50 First, courts distin-
guished between court-approved agreements, which they treated as contracts,
and court-adopted agreements, which they treated as judgments.5 1 If a court-
44. See Shoafv. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117
S.E.2d 826 (1961). The major technical distinctions between the effect of a separation agreement and
a property settlement are as follows: (1) Tax Consequences-support payments made pursuant to a
separation agreement are considered as alimony and are deductible for supporting spouse, but pay-
ments in property settlement are not; (2) Support payments in separation agreement normally will
not survive past the death of either spouse, but payments or conveyances in property settlement
usually will survive either party's death; (3) Alimony payments in a separation agreement will not
be discharged in bankruptcy but property settlement liabilities may be discharged; (4) Reconcilia-
tion and resumed cohabitation of parties will rescind executory provisions of a separation agreement
but will have no effect on property settlements. See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 19, § 3, at 15-17;
Sharp, supra note 25, at 826 n.38; 24 Am. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 817 (1983).
45. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 826-27; see also 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 461 (com-
mon practice upon marriage breakup for parties to make contract covering every subject upon which
they can agree).
46. 2 IL LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 462. The Buffingtons' agreement covered everything
from a waiver of alimony to property division to custody of their golden retriever. Record at 4-14,
Buffington.
47. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
49. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983) (modifiability ofseparation agree-
ments); Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1977) (effect of reconciliation on separa-
tion agreements).
50. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 462-63. But cf. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381,
386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 341-42 (1983) (recognizing "great confusion" in area of family law dealing with
separation agreements presented to the court). Until the Walters decision, a "consent judgment" in
North Carolina was "basically nothing more than a private contract between [spouses] that ha[d]
been entered upon the records of, and received the stamp of approval from a court." Sharp, supra
note 25, at 826.
51. Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 183, 287 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1982); White v. White, 296 N.C.
661, 665, 252 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (1979); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69-70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243
(1964); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 708, 245 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1978). In general, the relationship
between a separation agreement and the divorce decree of a court produces one of three results.
First, the agreement may survive the decree as a private contract. The parties can enforce the agree-
ment as they would enforce any contract and can modify the terms of the agreement only if both
parties consent. Second, the parties can present their agreement to the court for approval. These
court-approved agreements also leave the parties with basic contract rights. The court cannot mod-
ify the agreement without consent of both parties, but court approval does have res judieata effect as
to the absence of fraud and the fairness of the agreement. Last, the agreement may be adopted by
the court so that the parties' contract rights are extinguished and the court replaces the contract
provisions with its own judgment. Merger or adoption are the common terms used to describe this
relationship. Support provisions that are merged or adopted by the court are subject to modification
1170 [Vol. 63
1985] DOMESTIC LAW
adopted agreement contained separable and independent provisions, a court
could not modify the property division terms, but could modify the alimony
provisions.5 2 If the support provisions and the property distribution provisions
constituted reciprocal consideration for each other, the court-adopted agreement
became "integrated."5 3 No provision of an integrated agreement was subject to
modification without the parties' consent.5 4 Last, if a court could not determine
whether the parties intended that their agreement be integrated, the court would
presume that the provisions were separable.5
5
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently modified these well-settled
rules. In Walters v. Walters56 the supreme court turned settled law on its head
in an attempt to "simplify" the issues surrounding the modifiability of separa-
tion agreements.5 7 The decision in Walters established a new rule: Any separa-
tion agreement brought before a court loses its status as a private contract and
becomes a judgment of the court. 58 Thus, all provisions of court-approved and
court-adopted separation agreements are now subject to modification regardless
of whether the support and property division sections are reciprocal.
5 9
Another shift in the law governing marital agreements involved the effect of
reconciliation and the effect of cohabitation by separated spouses on the validity
of separation agreements. The well-established rule in North Carolina had been
that "where a husband and wife enter into a separation agreement and thereafter
become reconciled and renew their marital relations, the agreement is termi-
by the court without the consent of both parties. See W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESmC
RELATIONS 560 (3d ed. 1978); Sharp, supra note 25, at 848.
52. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 666, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); Holsomback v. Hol-
somback, 273 N.C. 728, 732, 161 S.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1968); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136
S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 708-09, 245 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1978); 2 R.
LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 462-63; Sharp, supra note 25, at 863. See Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C.
177, 183-84, 287 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1982).
53. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 851-52.
54. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661,666-67, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C.
67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1978);
see Sharp, supra note 25, at 851-52, 863.
55. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 672, 252 S.E.2d 698, 704 (1979); see Rowe v. Rowe, 305
N.C. 177, 184, 287 S.E.2d 840, 845 (1982); Walters v. Walters, 54 N.C. App. 545, 550, 284 S.E.2d
151, 155 (1981), rev'd, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983); see also Sharp, supra note 25, at 863-64
(Although it is easy to indicate that provisions in a separation agreement are intended to be separa-
ble, "[u]nfortunately these distinctions are frequently not made.").
56. 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
57. Id. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court explained that this was not a harsh rule because parties could protect the
contract status of their separation agreement by not bringing it before the court. Id. In a case
decided the same day as Walters, the supreme court made it clear that the enforceability of a separa-
tion agreement through the court's contempt power depended on its inclusion in a court-ordered
judgment. Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 407, 298 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1983). Even a separa-
tion agreement kept out of court initially could become part of a court order for specific performance
and could then be enforced by contempt proceedings. Id. at 407 n.1, 298 S.E.2d at 350 n.1; see also
Harris v. Harris, 307 N.C. 684, 300 S.E.2d 369 (1983) (court can hold person in contempt for past
violation of specific performance order); Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979) (wife
given remedy of specific performance for husband's failure to make payments required by separation
agreement); Erhart v. Erhart, 67 N.C. App. 189, 312 S.E.2d 534 (1984) (court cannot alter terms of
private agreement between spouses but it can alter amount ordered in specific performance remedy).
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nated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory." 60 In practice, reconcil-
iation affects property settlement provisions differently from support provisions
in a separation agreement. Because the parties usually execute a property settle-
ment provision or a conveyance of property shortly after signing the separation
agreement, a subsequent reconciliation will not affect such "executed" provi-
sions.61 In a 1976 case, In re Estate of Adamee,62 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that "reconciliation" occurred when the couple resumed living to-
gether in their marital home and held themselves out as husband and wife.63
Two years after Adamee, in Murphy v. Murphy,64 the supreme court reaffirmed a
1932 case holding that sexual intercourse between separated spouses will have
the effect of a reconciliation "whether the resumption of sexual relations was
'casual', 'isolated', or otherwise." 65 The Murphy holding made North Carolina
the only state to define reconciliation in terms of either living together or engag-
ing in sex.66
While the North Carolina courts struggled to deal with the definition and
effects of separation agreement provisions, the North Carolina General Assem-
bly made a major change in property division law by passing an equitable distri-
bution act.67 Section (d) of the act allows parties to make their own property
distribution agreement "before, during and after marriage." 68 Such property
settlements bar application of the equitable distribution act so long as the parties
60. Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261, 90 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1955); see Murphy v. Murphy, 295
N.C. 390, 394, 245 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1978); In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 391, 230 S.E.2d
541, 545 (1976); Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630, 634, 151 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1966); Joyner v. Joyner,
264 N.C. 27, 31, 140 S.E.2d 714, 717-18 (1965); Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 415, 74 S.E.
327, 330 (1912); Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 317, 311 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1984);
Whitt v. Whitt, 32 N.C. App. 125, 129, 230 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1977); Potts v. Potts, 24 N.C. App.
673, 674, 211 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1975); 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 200; Sharp, supra note 25, at 839.
61. See Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630, 634, 151 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1966); Joyner v. Joyner, 264
N.C. 27, 31, 140 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1965); Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261, 90 S.E.2d 547, 549
(1952); Whitt v. Whitt, 32 N.C. App. 125, 129, 230 S.E.2d 793, 795-96 (1977); Potts v. Potts, 24
N.C. App. 673, 674,211 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1975); 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 200, at 518. The court of
appeals has held that a spouse cannot change an otherwise fully executed property provision into an
executory provision simply by avoiding compliance with the executed agreement. Whitt v. Whitt, 32
N.C. App. 125, 130, 230 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1977).
62. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
63. Id. at 392-93, 230 S.E.2d at 546. The wife had returned to the home and lived there contin-
uously from January through August 1974. Id.; see also Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d
489 (1945) (no separation occurred when spouses ceased sexual relations but continued to live to-
gether in the same house for two years).
64. 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
65. Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698. In support of its ruling, the court stated, "'otherwise, the
separation agreement would degenerate into a mere cloak or device by means of which the husband
would escape the responsibilities imposed by the marital status and yet be free to partake of such
privileges as he chose to enjoy.'" Id. at 396-97, 245 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting State v. Gossett, 203
N.C. 641, 644, 166 S.E. 754, 755 (1932)).
66. Sharp, supra note 25, at 842. Professor Sharp points out that the result of North Carolina's
unique "either/or" standard is to discourage attempted reconciliation and to raise suspicions that
such an attempt is a pretext for trying to terminate the agreement. Id. at 842 & n.129.
67. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
68. The original draft of this section read "[b]efore and during marriage." Act of July 3, 1981,
ch. 815, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184, 1185. The change may indicate the general assembly's
intent to protect property settlements made after separation or divorce.
1172 [Vol. 63
deem that the agreement is equitable.69 Integrating this breakthrough in statu-
tory law7" with the ever shifting case law on property settlements and separation
agreements was the task faced by the court of appeals in Buffington.
The most critical mistake made by the court in Buffington was perpetuating
the semantic confusion that has plagued domestic law for some time.7 1 The
opinion repeatedly interchanged the terms "property settlement" and "separa-
tion agreement" without distinguishing between them.72 Through its casual use
of language, the court misstated the common-law rule as requiring "actual sepa-
ration of the parties to a marriage in order for a property settlement to be effec-
tive."' 73 The rule actually applies to separation agreements which may or may
not include property settlement provisions.74 In addition, the court failed to
address how the equitable distribution statute, governing "property distribu-
tion" agreements, affected Buffington, which involved a "separation
agreement. ' '7
5
Assuming that the court of appeals meant to apply its holding only to pure
property settlements or to independent property settlement provisions within a
separation agreement, the Buffington decision makes sense. 76 By interpreting
section 50-20(d) as not requiring immediate separation for a property settlement
agreement to be valid, the court complied with several well-known common-law
principles. These principles-upholding postnuptial settlements without a sepa-
ration, 77 upholding property division provisions in separation agreements as
nonmodifiable without the consent of both parties,78 and upholding executed
property division provisions after the parties have reconciled 79-reflect the more
modem policy in favor of allowing parties to determine their property rights
without court intervention. The court's interpretation also was consistent with
the basic purpose of equitable distribution-to recognize marriage as a partner-
ship.80 Absent any requirement of immediate separation, section 50-20(d) sim-
ply gives spouses the freedom to make property division contracts as equal
partners at any point in their relationship. Thus, under a generous reading, the
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1984). The section made no allowance for judicial review of
the parties' agreement. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
70. Before the advent of equitable distribution statutes, common-law states simply divided
property based on which spouse held the title. This title system completely ignored contributions
made by the homemaker. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 870 (1983).
71. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
72. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 486-88, 317 S.E.2d at 99-100.
73. Id. at 455, 317 S.E.2d at 100 (emphasis added).
74. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75. The court consistently referred to "property settlements" when discussing the statute or the
common law and to "separation agreement[s]" when discussing the facts of the case. Buffington, 69
N.C. App. at 486-88, 317 S.E.2d at 99-100.
76. In McArthur v. McArthur, 68 N.C. App. 484,487,315 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1984), the court of
appeals held that the equitable distribution act "did not purport to change the general validity of
separation agreements."
77. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
78. This was the understanding prior to 1983. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
But cf supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (Walters decision leaves all provisions in court-
approved separation agreement open to modification.).
79. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Buffington case holds that a separation agreement not followed by actual separa-
tion is valid only to the extent that its provisions qualify as a property
settlement. 81
Unfortunately, the Buffington decision was not clearly articulated. A literal
interpretation of the inaccurate language used by the court, combined with re-
cent North Carolina case law on separation agreements, only confuses this area
of domestic law. Major problems surface as possible consequences of a strict
reading of Buffington.
Given the court's loose terminology, one could interpret Buffington as re-
moving the immediate separation requirement from both property settlements
and separation agreements.8 2 The court refused to void a separation agreement
even though the parties had continued to live together for eighteen days. This
holding conflicts with the North Carolina definition of "reconciliation" and its
effect on separated parties.8 3 Under Buffington, a court would enforce a separa-
tion agreement despite the continued cohabitation of the parties. Under Mur-
phy, however, a court would void a separation agreement if the parties lived
apart but engaged in occasional sexual relations,8 4 and under Adamee, a court
would strike a separation agreement if the parties held themselves out as married
even if they never engaged in sex.85 Such absurd results probably cut directly
against the parties' intentions.8 6 The Murphy decision has prompted criticism
for discouraging attempted reconciliations between separated parties.87 By fol-
lowing Buffington, an attorney might advise parties who actually intend to sepa-
rate and want an agreement enforceable if attempts at reconciliation fail to
continue living together for a few weeks after signing the agreement.8 8 The
Buffington opinion leaves unanswered the question of when North Carolina law
requires separation for a valid separation agreement.
The Buffington decision, combined with the Walters rule,8 9 encourages par-
ties to keep their property distribution agreements out of the court's reach.90 As
81. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 817 (1983); see also Cator v. Cator, 70 N.C.
App. 719, 321 S.E.2d 36 (1984) (equitable distribution act will not modify binding separation
agreement).
82. Both parties raised the issue and argued against this result. Brief for Defendant-Appellant
at 18; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 9-10.
83. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. In Buffington, defendant argued that she and her husband did not intend to separate imme-
diately and permanently, despite the language in the agreement. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at
11. In Murphy, plaintiff claimed that he never agreed to a resumption of marital relations although
he did have occasional sex with the defendant. Murphy, 295 N.C. at 393-94, 245 S.E.2d at 695-96.
87. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 842.
88. On the other hand, the same attorney would advise a separated client to stay away from his
or her spouse to avoid any encounter that might lead to an absolutely void separation agreement
under the Murphy rule. See supra note 66.
89. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
90. The Walters court stated that parties could keep a property settlement enforceable and
modifiable under traditional contract methods by not presenting it to a court for approval. Walters,
307 N.C. at 387, 298 S.E.2d at 342. Judge Copeland writing for the majority in Walters clearly
intended to encourage parties to contract outside the courtroom. See id. at 386-87, 298 S.E.2d at
342; see also Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 190-92, 287 S.E.2d 840, 848-49 (1982) (Copeland, J.,
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a private contract, the terms of the property settlement would be modifiable only
by the parties91 and enforceable by contract remedies, including specific per-
formance. 92 So long as the parties agree that the property settlement is equita-
ble, North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20(d) will operate to bar
equitable distribution by the court. 93 This process, however, ignores the poten-
tial for overreaching and unfairness in marital contracts negotiated wholly
outside the courtroom.94 Despite occasional references in cases to a fairness
standard for separation agreements,95 North Carolina courts rarely have given
more than perfunctory review to marital agreements. 96 Walters, Buffington, and
North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20(d) all encourage freedom of con-
tract between spouses for both property settlement and support provisions in a
separation agreement. Simultaneously, these decisions limit judicial review of
the agreement's ultimate fairness. At some point, North Carolina courts must
consider whether contract remedies alone provide sufficient protection for
spouses negotiating a separation agreement or whether some type of judicial re-
view is necessary to ensure fair terms for spousal support.
97
In its efforts to clarify North Carolina domestic law, the court of appeals
produced even more confusion with its Buffington decision. Confined to its spe-
cific holding that section 50-20(d) "permits spouses to execute a property settle-
ment at any time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter or
not,"' 98 the Buffington case advances the concept of marriage as a partnership99
and retreats further from archaic rules against agreements contemplating di-
vorce. 1o The ambiguous language used throughout the opinion, however, only
contributes to the list of unanswered questions presently facing the drafter of
separation agreements. For instance, when, if at all, are parties required to live
dissenting in part) (parties should be able to agree on final alimony settlement without interference
by court).
91. See Waiters, 307 N.C. at 387, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
92. See supra note 59.
93. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
94. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 1405-07. Professor Sharp argues that separation agreements are
fundamentally different from other contracts because they deal with issues of highest personal signif-
icance, such as child custody and support rights. Thus, conditions for negotiating separation agree-
ments are highly stressful. Id.
95. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 195-96, 159 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1968) (separa-
tion agreement must be fair, reasonable, and just and must be untainted by fraud or undue influ-
ence); Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 415, 74 S.E. 2d 327, 330 (1912) (separation agreement
must be fair and reasonable to the wife in light of all circumstances of execution); Johnson v. John-
son, 67 N.C. App. 250, 255, 313 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1984) ("'R]elief will be granted if the [separation
agreement] is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other's overreaching.").
96. Sharp, supra note 3, at 1409. Until 1977, North Carolina required a private examination of
the wife to ensure the fairness of the separation agreement. These "privy exams," however, were
little more than rubber stamps of the parties' agreement. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 828-29, 833-
34.
97. "Husbands and wives are not strangers, and to subject them to contract principles gov-
erning negotiations between strangers undermines the very heart of the concept of marriage as a
sharing enterprise and ignores the psychological and economic realities of most spousal relation-
ships." Sharp, supra note 3, at 1459.
98. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
99. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
1985] DOMESTIC LAW 1175
1176 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
separate and apart for a court to consider their separation agreement valid?
When, if ever, will North Carolina courts recognize the danger of blindly mov-
ing toward total contractual freedom for spouses without some concern for the
ultimate fairness of the agreement? If nothing more, North Carolina courts
must explicitly distinguish between a "property settlement" and a "separation
agreement." Otherwise, the equitable distribution statute will become hope-
lessly entangled in the semantic web of domestic case law.
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